Chapter One

COMPLEMENTARY, SUPPLEMENTARY, OR
ADVERSARIAL? A THEORETICAL AND
HISTORICAL EXAMINATION OF
NONPROFIT-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS IN
THE UNITED STATES
Dennis R. Young

INTRODUCTION

From time to time, public policymakers in the United States take an
oversimplified view of the nonprofit sector and its relationship with
government. In the 1980s, the Reagan administration argued that, as
government cut back on its expenditures for public services, the non
profit sector would simply fill the vacuum through volunteer effort
and charitable contributions (Bremner 1988; Salamon 1995). In the
1990s, House Speaker Newt Gingrich expressed a similar view
through his program Contract with America (U.S. Congress 1995),
while members of Congress proposed the Istook amendment, which
would have curtailed lobbying by nonprofit organizations receiving
federal funds. According to these perspectives, nonprofits were sim
ply service organizations, capable of running on voluntary resources
and with no legitimate role in public policy formation.
The left has made similar errors of oversimplification that have
disparaged private philanthropy and implicitly extolled governmental
solutions to public needs:
Philanthropy remained in bad repute in liberal and radical circles
throughout the 1930s.... Eduard C. Lindeman ... whose Wealth and
Culture (1936) was a study of the operation of one hundred foundations
during the 1920s, offered an economic interpretation of modern philan
thropy: it was disintegrating capitalism's way of distributing, in its
own interests, wealth which could not be spent on luxuries, was not
needed for reinvestment, and could not profitably be employed for
speculation. Foundations. and by implication, all large-scale benefac
tions. denoted the development of a rudimentary social consciousness
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in the donors, but they also represented the donors' determination to
control social thought and expression (Bremner 1988, 152).

The reality of government-nonprofit sector relations in the United
States is far richer and more complex than such one-dimensional
views suggest. Nonprofit organizations interact with government in
several different ways; these patterns of interaction vary over time and
among different fields of service. In various contexts, nonprofits have
served as privately supported supplementary service providers of pub
lic goods, as complementary partners with government in public ser
vice provision, and as advocates and adversaries in the process of
public policy formulation and implementation. Often, two or three of
these roles are manifested simultaneously.
In this chapter, we trace the historical evolution of these three
modes of government-nonprofit relations. Various strands of economic
theory pertaining to nonprofit organizations illuminate the circulIl
stances under which we can expect non profits to fulfill different roles
vis-a.-vis government-supplementary, complementary, and adversar
ial. These three theoretical modes of government-nonprofit relation
ships are first explained and then applied as conceptual screens for
examining the history of government-nonprofit sector relationships
in the United States, from colonial times to the present. Each theoret
ical cut reveals new insights into the complex of relationships be
tween nonprofits and government, and no single view provides a full
understanding.
Finally, we consider how the alternative views of government
nonprofit relations can inform the present debate on the roles of
government, nonprofits , and business in the United States. Recent
developments, including governmental retrenchment and devolution,
privatization of public services, restructuring in the business sector,
and commercialization in the nonprofit sector, have dislocated extant
patterns of government-nonprofit sector relationships. Government
no longer takes comprehensive responsibility for social welfare; cor
porations have become more narrowly strategic in their philanthropic
programs; substantial new private wealth has been created among
business entrepreneurs; and nonprofits have become more competi
tive and market-oriented in their quests to remain financially viable
and to address growing social needs. This shuffling of institutional
conditions leaves open to question how the sectors will continue to
divide responsibilities and work together to solve social problems and
meet public needs in the future. Our review of the history of govern
ment-nonprofit relations through the three theoretical lenses suggests

An Examination of Nonprofit-Government Relations in the U.S.

33

that a new "social contract" between government, nonprofits, and
business must emerge if public needs are to be met.

STRANDS OF THEORY
Different strands of economic theory support alternative notions of
the nonprofit sector as supplementary, complementary, or adversarial
to government. (This taxonomy is similar to that postulated by Najam
(1997) for relations between government and nongovernmental orga
nizations internationally.) In the supplementary model, nonprofits are
seen as fulfilling demand for public goods left unsatisfied by govern
ment. In this view, the private financing of public goods can be ex
pected to have an inverse relationship with government expenditure.
As government takes more responsibility for provision, less needs to
be raised through voluntary collective means.
In the complementary view, nonprofits are seen as partners to gov
ernment, helping to deliver public goods largely financed by govern
ment. In this perspective, nonprofit and government expenditures
have a direct relationship with one another. As government expendi
tures increase, they help finance rising levels of nonprofit activity.
In the adversarial view, nonprofits prod government to make
changes in public policy and to maintain accountability to the public.
Reciprocally, government attempts to influence the behavior of non
profit organizations, by regulating their services and responding to
their advocacy initiatives as well. The adversarial view does not posit
any specific relationship between the levels of nonprofit and govern
mental activity. For example, nonprofits can advocate for smaller or
more efficient government operations, or they can advocate for new
programs and regulations that would increase government activity.
The three perspectives are by no means mutually exclusive. Non
profits may simultaneously finance and deliver services where govern
ment does not, deliver services that are financed or otherwise assisted
by government, advocate for changes in government policies and prac
tices, and be affected by governmental pressure and oversight. For
example, Kramer (1981) observed that nonprofits' reliance on public
funds to deliver services did not necessarily constrain their advocacy
activity.
Moreover, while the three views frame our discussion of nonprofit
government relations as if nonprofits and government were distinct
entities from one another, in fact, the boundaries are often blurred.
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For example, the governing boards of some nonprofit community de
velopment agencies have members appointed by government officials,
and many state universities and public libraries incorporate private
fundraising associations or foundations within their structures. To a
certain extent, such hybrids can be understood as forms of govern
ment-nonprofit collaboration vis-a-vis the complementary view of
nonprofit-government relations. More generally, however, we abstract
from some of the messy detail of the real world in the following
discussion and proceed under the assumption that government
nonprofit boundaries can be recognized without undue difficulty in
most instances.
In the same vein, we note that the three analytical views developed
here all derive essentially from rational choice models in the econom
ics tradition. Other schools of thought (e.g., behavioral and sociologi
cal theory) also contribute much to the understanding of institutional
relationships such as those between government and nonprofit~orga
nizations, as well as to an appreciation of the limitations of the eco
nomic approach (see Powell and DiMaggio 1991, chapter 1, for an
excellent discussion of these issues).
Nonprofits as Supplements to Government
The thesis that nonprofit organizations provide collective goods on a
voluntary basis was first advanced by Burton Weisbrod in his seminal
work on government failure (Weisbrod 1977). The basic premise is
that citizens have individual preferences about the levels, qualities,
and types of public goods they desire and how much they are willing
to pay for them. Governments decide on the level of public goods
provision based on citizens' preferences and are constrained by con
siderations of equity and bureaucratic procedure to tax and to offer
levels of public good in a uniform way (Douglas 1987J. Given demo
cratic voting and policymaking procedures, governments follow pref
erences of the median voter or of a dominant political coalition
(Buchanan and Tullock 1962) in choosing those uniform tax rates and
levels, types, and qualities of services. If citizen preferences are not
homogeneous, some citizens (e.g., those whose preferences vary sub
stantially from those of the median voterJ will be left unsatisfied,
either paying for and receiving more (of various types of) public goods
than they want, or paying less and receiving less than they want.
Citizens in the latter group are presumed willing to provide additional
levels of public good by mobilizing on a voluntary collective basis
through the nonprofit sector.
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Weisbrod (1977J points out that nonprofits are not the only solution
to the problem of public goods provision where the preferences of the
citizenry are heterogeneous. Various private market substitutes for
public goods may be purchased by citizens instead (e.g., guard dogs
to supplement public policing). Moreover, where multiple local polit
ical jurisdictions exist, as they do in the United States, people may
move to communities where tax rates and public goods levels best
match their preferences (Tiebout 1956). These solutions, however, all
have their limitations. Exercising mobility is costly. Political jurisdic
tions package multiple public goods together so that citizens cannot
make perfect matches between communities and personal preferences
for services and taxes. And private goods are usually imperfect sub
stitutes for public goods. Hence, substantial room is left for nonprofits
to fill the role of supplementer of government services.
In light of this theory, we can expect substantial variation in non
profit sector-government relationships among fields of activity. In
areas such as the arts where citizen preferences vary widely, private
nonprofit provision can be expected to be substantial. In areas such
as policing and defense where preferences may be relatively homo
geneous, we can expect the nonprofit role to be less substantial. In
areas such as social services, where citizens' preferences can be vol
atile, we can expect nonprofit provision to respond to ebbs and flows
of public sentiment and consensus.
The supplementary model also suggests an interesting dynamic
when people's preferences change over time. In particular, public de
cisions to expand the role of government in areas traditionally served
by nonprofits can be viewed as a threat by the latter. Commenting on
government activism in the 1960s, for example, Bremner (1988) notes:
To some observers government intrusion into areas formerly the pre
serve of voluntary activity comprised a more serious threat to philan
thropy than internal rivalries (184).

Alternatively, however, the supplementary view also illuminates the
notion that private action is often actually intended to prod govern
ment into action. For example, the Ford Foundation's Public Affairs
Program in the 1960s funded "demonstration" programs "addressing
education and delinquency in the slums and mobilizing the electoral
strength of minority communities" (Bremner 1988, 187).
Nonprofits and Government as Complements
Lester Salamon (1995) has been the principal advocate for the view
that nonprofits and government are engaged primarily in a partner

36

An Overview of the Nonprofit-Government Relationship

ship or contractual relationship in which government finances public
services and nonprofits deliver them. Aspects of both economic theory
of public goods and economic theory of organizations help clarify the
rationale behind this thesis. First, the theory of collective action as
advanced by Mancur Olson (1965) highlights the phenomenon of "free
riding," when people attempt to provide collective goods on a volun
tary basis. Where the good to be provided is "nonrival" (Le., can be
consumed by one party without reducing the amount available to
others) and "nonexcludable" (Le., the good cannot be made available
to one party without making it simultaneously available to others),
then people have the incentive to avoid contributing to its provision
but to consume it once it is provided by others. As a result, such
goods will not be provided at efficient levels through voluntary col
lective effort. The problem of free riding is exacerbated where groups
are large and relatively homogeneous in their preferences (so that no
one party is tempted to provide the good on its own). Solutions to the
public goods problem include social pressure (e.g., appealing to con
science, peer-to-peer solicitations, etc.), tying together of private in
centives with public goods support (e.g., bonuses given to members
of public radio stations), and coercion (e.g., using the police power of
the state to collect taxes). It is the latter solution that suggests that
government should undertake to finance public goods, either directly
or through tax incentives, while not necessarily becoming the vehicle
for their delivery.
Economic theory of organizations, specifically several aspects of
the theory of the firm and transactions-cost theory, help illuminate
why, in many instances, it may be more efficient for government to
delegate delivery of services to private organizations (e.g., nonprofits)
than to deliver those services itself. Coase (1988) addresses the ques
tion of why a business firm, for example, would choose to carry out a
marginal transaction through the market rather than internally. For
example, why might a firm contract out for a particular task rather
than hire or direct its current employees to do it? One part of Coase's
explanation is that as an organization gets larger, the costs of admin
istering additional transactions, such as enlarging the bureaucracy,
rise. At some point it becomes cheaper to contract outside rather than
expand work internally, i.e., there are "diminishing returns to man
agement" as well as possible differences in direct production costs
inside versus outside the organization. Such an explanation appears
relevant to government provision of public services. Complaints about
the cost and inefficiencies of public bureaucracies are common. De
spite the costs of arranging and monitoring external contracts (see
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Gronbjerg 1997), it may be cheaper for governments to contract out for
certain services than perform them internally. In addition, labor costs
may be lower in the private sector if the latter is not unionized, and
private suppliers may be better able to exploit economies of scale for
certain services by producing them for more than one jurisdiction.
(See Ferris 1993 for a comprehensive discussion of government's de
cision to contract out.)
It is not clear that governments always try to minimize their pro
duction costs (see Niskanen 1971 for one explanation of why they
presumably do not). Assuming that they do sometimes try to reduce
costs, however, the Coase argument helps explain why governments
sometimes contract for service delivery with private suppliers. This
explanation does not distinguish between nonprofit and for-profit
contractors, however. Some additional considerations apply to this
issue. Another aspect of transactions-cost theory pertains to the in
formation an organization requires in order to carry out a market
transaction efficiently. In the case of public services, two aspects re
lated to the quality of services delivered appear relevant. First, gov
ernment may choose to contract out, not only because it is cheaper
but also because it may be unable to differentiate its services in re
sponse to the heterogeneous preferences of its citizens. There would
be too much information to gather in order to do so. By contracting
with nonprofits that are knowledgeable about the individual com
munities in which they are based, however, government can overcome
the information problem and, within limits, allow those delivery
agents to customize their services to local constituents.
To a certain extent, such differentiation would be possible if gov
ernment contracted with for-profit businesses as well, so long as those
businesses were community-based or conscientious about monitoring
the preferences of their customers. Without its own data, however,
how could government verify such responsiveness? Here is where
another aspect of the transaction-cost literature comes into play in
favor of nonprofits. Nonprofits operate under different incentives than
for-profits. In particular, they do not face the same imperatives to
skimp on quality, renege on promised service parameters, or lower
the costs of production by homogenizing services in order to increase
profits (see discussion of contract failure, below). Hence, government
presumably faces lower monitoring and contract enforcement costs
associated with ensuring differentiated, responsive community ser
vices, by contracting with nonprofits rather than with for-profits.
Steinberg (1997) points out that the arguments for nonprofits as less
costly contractors for government are subject to a number of caveats
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and subtleties associated with donor reactions to government financ
ing, the internal motives of nonprofit agents, the level of competition,
and the structure of the contracts themselves. Nonetheless he con
cludes that:
Non-profit organisations deserve some preference in bidding because
they provide benefits to the government (reduced opportunistic behav
ior and reduced transaction costs of negotiating, monitoring and en
forcing a contract) that cannot be enforceably written into a contract
with for-profits (Steinberg 1997, 176).

In all, the theory of public goods coupled with the theory of trans
actions costs provides a plausible explanation for why government
and nonprofits often engage in a complementary relationship in which
government finances and non profits deliver services. This relation
ship is more likely to be observed in areas such as social services
where free riding is a significant problem. where direct public pro
duction is likely to require a large bureaucratic operation, and where
differences in local preferences favor some differentiation of services
to alternative locales and consumer groups.
Finally, a curious but historically important variation of govern
ment-nonprofit complementary relationships occurs where the gov
ernment and nonprofit-sector roles are reversed in terms of financing
and service delivery. Interestingly, there are many instances through
out U.S. history where government has been the recipient of private
largesse for the purpose of carrying out public projects such as the
care of public monuments (see below). A theoretical explanation of
such behavior seems more consistent with the supplementary than
complementary view but with a slight twist: Private parties raise
funds for activities that would not be supported by public demand.
Moreover, the private givers find it more efficient, given the costs of
private supply, to "contract" with government for their production
rather than produce the goods themselves. (This would occur, for
example, where the projects represent marginal additions to public
sector operations and where private supply would have to start from
scratch.) Additionally, the public values these activities, accepts im
plementation within the public domain, and may even contribute
something to their financing. In this sense, private financing of gov
ernmental projects needs to be understood through both the supple
mentary and complementary lenses.
Nonprofits and Government as Adversaries
To date, the advocacy role of nonprofit organizations in public policy
and the role of government in controlling nonprofit organizations have
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not been explicitly addressed by economic theories of nonprofit or
ganizations. To a certain extent, nonprofit advocacy and government
pressure on nonprofits can be understood through the complementary
lens of nonprofit-government relations. Often, nonprofits and govern
ment are collaborators in passing legislation or changing public atti
tudes. Similarly, government sometimes encourages, prods. and
stimulates private, voluntary activity in support of social goals (see
below). But advocacy activity suggests that there is also a third way
of characterizing the relationship between nonprofit organizations
and government-as adversaries in policymaking and service delivery.
Again, however, bits and pieces of economic theory help to illumi
nate the adversarial relationship. On the issue of nonprofit advocacy,
Weisbrod's (1977) theory of government failure is again helpful. In
heterogeneous communities, where minority views are not well re
flected in public policy, minorities will organize themselves on a vol
untary collective basis, not only to provide public services for
themselves but also to press government to more adequately serve
their interests. In the basic Weisbrod model, government would have
no incentive to respond since it simply follows the preferences of the
majority. More nuanced analyses of public choice, however, which
allow for logrolling, vote trading, and concentration of minority efforts
on particular issues, demonstrate that organized minorities can be
effective in having their public policy concerns addressed (Buchanan
and Thllock 1962). Such minorities mobilize themselves through
voluntary associations or interest groupS, becoming an important
component of the government-nonprofit sector constellation of rela
tionships.
The Weisbrod model is also helpful for understanding how new
public services come into being through advocacy. Proposals for new
programs will at first be favored only by a minority of voters and
hence not immediately adopted by government. A minority of citizens
may promote the idea through advocacy and demonstrate its efficacy
with voluntary contributions. Nonprofit "think tanks" may playa role
in such efforts {Hall 1994} or, as noted above, foundations may fund
"demonstration projects" {Bremner 1991}. Such promotional efforts
may be successful in securing pilot funding from government. Even
tually the concept may be proven and receive the support of a major
ity, at which point government may undertake full-scale provision.
Economic theory is also helpful for understanding why government
is motivated to oversee nonprofit organization behavior and perfor
mance and sometimes to press nonprofit organizations to change. In
particular, the theory of contract failure first developed by Henry
Hansmann (1980) postulates that nonprofit organizations are chosen
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as efficient vehicles for delivering services where there is a condition
of "information asymmetry" between consumers and producers that
would allow a profit-making fum to exploit consumer ignorance to its
advantage. Nonprofits are seen to be more efficient in this circum
stance because the nondistribution constraint (which precludes the
distribution of "profits" to those who control the organization), as
Hansmann argues, or the internal governance structure of nonprofit
organizations, as Ben-Ner (1986) suggests, reduces the incentives and
opportunities for nonprofits to cheat consumers; this makes them
more "trustworthy."
Why then, if nonprofits are more trustworthy, does government need
to regulate them? Two reasons are implicit in the theory of contract
failure. First, the trustworthiness of nonprofit organizations depends
in part on the credibility of the nondistribution constraint and the
integrity of the nonprofit governance structure. These, in turn, must
be policed, and that is government's role. Government must ensure
that the nondistribution constraint is indeed observed (Young 1983)
and that appropriate principles are followed for constituting governing
boards, to ensure nonprofits' trustworthiness.
Second, contract failure may be seen as a broad phenomenon sub
ject to a variety of approaches and solutions, including licensure,
accreditation, competition, and other means. Utilization of nonprofits
is one weapon in the arsenal-and not necessarily a perfect or com
plete solution to the problem. Nonprofits also violate the trust put in
them on occasion, and some of the same oversight mechanisms that
government uses to oversee for-profit providers in various markets can
be applied to nonprofits as well.
Finally, it is interesting to return to Weisbrod's (1977) model in the
context of the nonprofit advocacy role and explore its implications for
government behavior. If nonprofits advocate for minority positions in
the policy arena, it follows that government may react by trying to
defend majority interests. One form that reaction may take is at
tempted restriction of nonprofit advocacy. In the guise of regulation,
government can become the adversary of nonprofits in the policy
arena. Recent deliberations over the Istook amendment, which pro
posed to curtail advocacy by nonprofits receiving any federal funds,
or the various deliberations leading to the restrictions on foundations
in the 1969 Tax Act (Bremner 1991; Hall 1994] may be partially under
stood in that light.
Finally, it is worth observing that nonprofits and government may
oppose one another for the simple reason that these parties indepen
dently pursue objects whose impacts are felt differently by the two
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parties. For example, public-sector initiatives to reduce taxes and sim
plify the tax code, although not intended to harm nonprofits, have the
effect of doing so. In such instances, the actions of the government
reflect Weisbrod's model of public-sector decisionmaking in which
the majority approves what it sees as a public good, and minority
(nonprofit] interests are forced to oppose what they view to be a public
bad.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

The supplementary, complementary, and adversarial theories, taken as
a cluster, themselves bear witness to the overall complexity of non
profit-government relationships. These are not mutually exclusive
ways of understanding those relationships but rather overlapping
models that each capture important elements of reality. History may
be examined in layers by asking sequentially: What do each of the
models reveal about the nature of government-nonprofit relationships
as they have evolved in the United States?
We proceed by reviewing, through each of the three theoretical
lenses, the history of the nonprofit sector in the United States at
various stages-colonial times, the early republic, post-Civil War,late
nineteenth and early twentieth century, and modern times-as doc
umented by several contemporary nonprofit-sector scholars. History
is examined here in a necessarily cursory fashion through secondary
and tertiary sources. This approach does not do justice to the work of
serious nonprofit historians, but it does suggest the utility of the
proposed theoretical framework in probing for a comprehensive un
derstanding of government-nonprofit relations and how they are
changing over time. Hopefully it partially addresses Hall's (1992)
complaint:
The shortcomings of the social sciences have stemmed primarily from
their ahistoricity and their tendency to fragment and thereby distort the
continuum of collective action (109-110).

Finally, it must be acknowledged that the very concept of nonprofit
as a sector is a modern construct that we must impose somewhat
awkwardly to analyze earlier historical periods. Like the blurring of
the boundaries between sectors in the modern era, this ambiguity of
institutional definitions requires a certain amount of license in mak
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ing observations on the essence of historical fact using the crude
instruments at hand.

History through the Supplementary Lens
On one level, the relative roles of government and nonprofit organi
zations in the United States may be appreciated by examining how
nonprofits have attended to collective needs left unaddressed by
government:
Americans had a long experience in founding voluntary agencies to
perform tasks which individuals could not accomplish alone and
which public bodies, for one reason or another, were not able to under
take [Bremner 1988, 176).
While documentation is spotty, it is clear that nonprofit activity
supplementary to government predates the U.S. republic. A review by
Lohmann (1992) suggests that colonists brought with them religion
based traditions of mutual aid:
Scottish immigrants to Boston formed the first ethnic mutual aid soci
ety in 1657, initiating a trend that continues today for virtually every
ethnic, racial, or nationality group.... A French religious order
founded the first American orphanage in New Orleans in 1718.... Res
idents of Williamsburg, Virginia and Philadelphia founded early men
tal hospitals (121).
Lohmann goes on to note that:
New England Puritans, Virginia planters, and Dutch colonists in New
York and New Jersey all adopted church-based relief committees as the
basis of colonial welfare systems. Only gradually did the New England
Puritan towns move to civil welfare administration. Although religious
voluntary associations date from the earliest settlement of New Eng
land, more secular associations of charitable and mutual aid societies,
fire brigades, lodges, and professional societies emerged later, mainly
in Boston (122).
O'Neill (1989) emphasizes the point that religion dominated what we
now think of as the nonprofit sector in colonial times and the early
period of the republic:
... religion was by far the most important part of what would come to
be known as the nonprofit sector. Arts and culture organizations were
nonexistent, health care was primitive and family based, formal educa
tion was far less extensive than it is now, social services were minimal,
and somewhat frowned upon, and there was nothing even vaguely re-

An Examination of Nonprofit-Government Relations in the U.S.

43

sembling grant making or international assistance organizations. As far
as the incipient nonprofit sector went, religion was virtually the only
game in town (25).
Interestingly, while religion and government were sometimes inter
twined during the colonial period, specifically in New England and
the South, O'Neill argues that the diversity of religious beliefs in the
colonies ultimately made necessary the separation of church and state,
hence reinforcing the development of the nonprofit sector as supple
mentary to government:
What started to emerge almost immediately in the English colonies
was the notion that allegiance to one country, culture, language and
tradition could coexist with sharp diversity in religious ideas and prac
tices ... the English colonists simply had to deal with the fact of reli
gious diversity; the economic, political, social, and military realities of
the New World left them no choice. It was principally this variety of
religious experience in colonial New England that prepared the way for
religious liberty. That idea and reality, in turn, played a critical role in
the development of the American third sector, since organized religion
not only was a major part of the sector but also spawned much of the
rest. Without religious diversity and state neutrality toward religion,
the American nonprofit experience would have been very different (26
27).

Bremner (1988) notes that in the early period of the republic, private
initiative in higher education was a particularly important area of
nonprofit activity as a supplement to government:
The field of higher education, neglected by the federal government and
very poorly supported by the states, gave philanthropists their greatest
opportunity for service. A nation growing rapidly in population and
wealth possibly needed more colleges than the twenty-odd in existence
at the start of the century (48).
O'Neill (1989) describes one of many examples where privately
based initiatives ultimately led to adoption by government in the first
half of the nineteenth century:
In 1813 ... Quakers
founded the first private psychiatric hospital in
the United States
With a revolutionary set of practices, the Quak
ers released the insane from their chains, gave each a private room
with a window, allowed them to walk around the wooded grounds and
work in the hospital gardens, and made caring conversation the basis
of treatment. When the State Lunatic Hospital at Harrisburg was
opened in 1851, the Pennsylvania General Assembly declared that the
quality of care should be the highest and should be based on the
Quaker model (72-73).
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In both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the traditions of
self-help, both religious and secular but largely separate from govern
ment, continued to be very important:
Most nineteenth century U.S. residents immigrated from cultures with
broad repertoires of associational and common practices.... Cultur
ally, these immigrants were already armed with many organizational
skills.... From the start these skills were used in organizing fire com
panies, mutual aid societies, local governments, and an array of other
associations.... During much of the nineteenth and early twentieth
century, fraternal organizations serving both civic and quasi-religious
functions were an important means of social integration for the middle
and lower classes, particularly in predominantly rural areas (Lohmann
1992,123).

Bremner (1988) observes that "The twenty-five or thirty years after
the Civil War seemed, to Americans living at the time, an era of
stunning achievement in all fields of philanthropy" (85). Nielsen
(1979) claims that the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was
the period in which private initiative peaked in its prominence:
... in the last decades of the nineteenth century and the first decades
of the twentieth century, many Third Sector institutions-in addition
to the churches-developed private sources of support and simultane
ously an ideology of separateness which affected the policies of both
private agencies and government (14).

The surge of private, nonprofit initiative supplemental to govern
ment in this period was fueled by a combination of new and enormous
private, concentrated industrial wealth and political progressivism
stemming from industrialization, urbanization, and immigration. Ac
cording to Hall (1992):
... the use of private nonprofit organizations grew enormously in the
last decades of the nineteenth century. Big business and private wealth
underwrote the growth of universities, libraries, hospitals, museums,
social-welfare organizations, professional societies, and private clubs.
At the same time, the middle and lower classes supported labor
unions, mutual-benefit societies, fraternal organizations, volunteer fire
companies, building and loan associations, and even cooperatively
owned nonprofit businesses. Growing awareness of urban poverty
among the middle and upper classes encouraged the establishment of
charitable organizations of every sort, ranging from traditional funds
for the relief of the sick, poor, and disabled to new forms of nonprofit
activity, such as settlement houses and charity organizations.... No
less important than the private organizations directed to the reform of
society was the rise of new kinds of cultural organizations whose pri-
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mary constituencies were the rich. The establishment and professional
ization of museums and symphony orchestras ... played a major role
in recasting the nature of urban culture (39).

Andrew Carnegie's Gospel of Wealth was influential in this period
and supportive of the concept of philanthropy as a substitute for
government programming:
According to the gospel of wealth, philanthropy was less the handmaid
of social reform than a substitute for it. Wise administration of wealth
was an antidote for radical proposals for redistributing property and a
method of reconciling the poor and the rich (Bremner 1988, 102).

The role of women was especially important in creating voluntary
associations that addressed social needs in this era of weak govern
ment:
While wealthy businessmen such as John D. Rockefeller and Andrew
Carnegie lavished massive donations on growing crops of foundations,
universities, museums, and think tanks created in the corporate image
of their business ventures, women-even very wealthy women-con
tinued to build their own organizations through an economy of time,
rather than cash ... [These] voluntary associations were unusually in
fluential in weak governmental systems, such as that of the United
States in this era ... (McCarthy 1997, 145-146).

Of great long-term significance in this period was the invention of
the modern foundation, which institutionalized the ability of private
interests to fund nonprofit-sector activity in a focused manner:
... credit for establishing the first foundation of the modern type-an
open-ended endowment devoted "to the good of mankind," which car
ried out its charitable purposes by giving money to institutions rather
than operating them, and which entrusted decision making to staffs of
experts ... went ... to Margaret Olivia Slocum Sage, the widow of
Wall Street buccaneer Russell Sage.... Mrs. Sage decided to establish
a philanthropic trust "elastic in form and method to work in different
ways at different times" for "the permanent improvement of social con
ditions" (Hall 1992, 47).

As Hall notes, the Russell Sage Foundation was followed by the major
foundation initiatives of Andrew Carnegie, John D. Rockefeller, and
other industrial giants. Those initiatives were but one aspect of a
broader strategy of "welfare capitalism" that allowed private initiative
and wealth to underwrite a variety of programs supplemental to gov
ernment's own efforts:
Sometimes welfare capitalism involved direct corporate subsidies of
charitable organizations, as with the massive support by the railroad
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industry of the Young Men's Christian Association (Y.M.C.A.)....
Companies also contributed to the creation of parks and playgrounds,
schools, and libraries ... (50).
Other institutional innovations, including the community foundation
and the community chest, also emanated from the era of business and
private social activism in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
as means to coordinate the development and allocation of private
resources to community needs (Hall 1992, 51).
While much of the twentieth century witnessed the growing role of
government in the provision of public services of all varieties, supple
mental provision by nonprofit-sector institutions has persisted and
indeed grown. Early in the depression of the 1930s, for example, Pres
ident Hoover perhaps unduly emphasized charity as a substitute for
potential government relief. Partially as a consequence of this expe
rience, charity fell into some public disrepute between the 1930s and
the 1960s (Bremner 1988). But measurements made since then (in the
1980s) of the size and scope of the sector reveal the substantial char
acter and continued growth of churches, foundations, trade and
professional associations, and other subsectors that support them
selves without government help and that provide collective goods
essentially supplemental to that of the government sector. Indeed, the
number of foundations has continued to grow over the course of the
century, along with the real value of assets they hold and the alloca
tions they dispense (Hodgkinson and Weitzman 1996). Moreover, the
measured part of the supplemental nonprofit sector may indeed rep
resent only a fraction of the total picture. If David Horton Smith
(1997a) is correct, existing quantitative research has missed a sub
stantial fraction of the grassroots organizations that provide great mag
nitudes of self-help, communal, relief, and other services, essentially
on a volunteer basis without significant exchange of funds, and sup
plemental to government. These organizations trace back even further
than formalized nonprofit organizations and have been part of the
American scene since the beginning (Smith 1997b).
Finally, the end of the twentieth century may be witness to a re
surgence of the supplemental model, not just in the United States but
internationally. Weisbrod (1997) notes:
. . . the growing importance of nonprofits everywhere, as population
migration and the flow of information through television and com
puters have the effect of magnifyiilg diversity in country after coun
try.... This growing diversity of societies is bringing, everywhere,
retrenchment of government and increased reliance on the nonprofit
sector (542-543).
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The supplementary lens identifies an important component of the
history of nonprofit sector-government relations in the United States.
In various contexts, private citizens, rich as well as those of limited
means, have often provided for themselves and for others. In some
cases, such activity is supplemental to existing government provision;
in other cases, the nonprofit sector creates and supports new forms
of collective activity not previously undertaken by government. His
tory shows as well that such activity is undertaken by minorities,
including ethnic and religious groups, as well as by business leaders
with their own social preferences and agendas, different from the
political majority, in a manner that appears consistent with the sup
plemental theory of voluntary collective action.
Some scholars argue, however, that the supplemental mode of non
profit-government relations is not the dominant stream. For example,
Hall (1992) claims that voluntary associations were relatively sparse
and subservient to government in the eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries. And Nielsen (1979) considers the period of private-sector
vigor in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to have been
an aberration from the more pervasive mode of nonprofit sector
government interpenetration. Thus, the supplementary lens gives only
a partial view, and we need to take another look through the comple
mentary lens.
History through the Complementary Lens

Several scholars, including Hall (1992), Nielsen (1979), Bremner
(1991), McCarthy (undated, 1997), and Salamon (1987), have observed
that governmental partnerships with private philanthropy and non
profit organizations have been a part of the American scene from
colonial times. No less prominent a figure than Benjamin Franklin
was a proponent of public/private collaboration:
His political talents were never better displayed than in his ability to
unite public and private support behind municipal improvements. He
played a leading part in the establishment of both the Pennsylvania
Hospital (1751) and the academy which became the University of Penn
sylvania (Bremner 1988, 17-18).
The case of Harvard University is often cited as the earliest example
of public support and nonprofit provision:
The situation of Harvard College, the oldest eleemosynary corporation
in the colonies, illustrates well the anomalous status of all colonial cor
porations. Although chartered as a corporation, the college was gov
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erned by boards composed of ministers of the tax supported
Congregational church and government officials sitting ex officio. Al
though Harvard possessed a small endowment, given partly by benevo
lent colonists and partly by British friends, it was regarded as a public
institution because most of its revenues came from legislative grants
and from tuitions and fees (Hall 1992, 16-17).

Parallel situations characterized Yale vis-a-vis the state of Connecticut
(Salamon 1987) and Williams College (Massachusetts), Columbia
(New York), and the University of Pennsylvania (Nielsen 1979).
Similar arrangements were found in the health and social services
in colonial and postrevolutionary times:
Early hospitals such as Pennsylvania Hospital, founded in 1752, of
fered health care for indigent patients with their expenses paid by local
or colonial governments. Private institutions for the mentally ill such
as the Hartford (Ct.) Retreat and McLean Hospital in Boston used state
and local government funds to provide care for indigent mentally ill
patients (Smith and Lipsky 1993, 47).

Governmental involvement and financial support of private, non
profit organizations providing higher education, hospital care, and
social services, begun in the early republic, continued unabated
through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For example, Nielsen
(1979) cites Massachusetts General Hospital, Louisville General Hos
pital, University Hospital in Baltimore, and Natchez Charity Hospital
as examples of private, nonprofit institutions established or supported
with state government funds in the years between 1820 and 1840.
McCarthy (undated) documents similar activity in the arts after the
civil war. And Salamon (1987) observes that toward the end of the
nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, government sup
port of hospitals and nonprofit social service organizations was fairly
common:
A survey of seventeen major private hospitals in 1889
revealed that
12 to 13 percent of their income came from government
[and] ... a
1901 survey of government subsidization of private charities found that
"except possibly two territories and four western states, there is proba
bly not a state in the union where some aid [to private charities] is not
given either by the state or by counties and cities" (100, 101).

Observers seem to agree, however, that governmental support of non
profit organizations did not become extensive until the mid-twentieth
century. According to Smith and Lipsky (1993):
... government funding of private service organizations was not exten
sive by today's standards. A 1914 survey revealed that "22 states made
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no appropriations whatever to privately managed charities, fifteen
make such appropriations sparingly, and nine place no apparent re
strictions on their grants" (49).

In the 1930s, however, the federal Works Progress Administration pro
moted an especially important example of government-nonprofit col
laboration in the arts, helping important institutions such as
Chicago's Art Institute, the Cincinnati Museum, and New York's Met
ropolitan Museum survive financially:
Although Federal One and the Treasury arts program are the most fa
miliar examples of Depression Era government patronage, the influence
of the WPA extended to local cultural institutions as well, adding a
new slant to the practice of third party government. ... By 1933, the
[Metropolitan] Museum's investment income was diminishing as well,
generating salary cuts. By 1936, however, staff costs were being offset
by workers seconded from the WPA. Clerical staff, carpenters, painters,
masons, lecturers, even guards were provided with support from the
public till (McCarthy, undated, 18-19).

Government-nonprofit collaboration picked up Some lost steam in
the 1960s. The public/private partnership in public service, never dis
solved but in abeyance during and for some years after the New Deal,
took on new life in the 1960s and 1970s (Bremner 1988, 210). And
Salamon, writing in 1987, observed that "although government sup
port of the voluntary sector has deep historical roots in this country
... this support has grown considerably in scope and depth over the
past thirty years" (101).
The magnitude and scope of governmental support and contracting
with nonprofits began to grow dramatically in the 1960s because of
expansion in federal programs. For example:
Federal expenditures for social welfare services almost tripled between
1965 and 1970.... The federal role continued to expand throughout the
1970s.... A big percentage of the increase in public funding of social
services was expended through nonprofit agencies.... Faced with pub
lic pressure to expand social services, particularly for the poor, Con
gress enacted the 1967 Amendments to the Social Security Act. ...
which specifically encouraged states to enter into purchase-of-service
agreements with private agencies.... A 1971 study indicated that 25
percent of state spending on social services was for purchased ser
vices.... By 1976 this expenditure had risen to 49% (Smith and Lip
sky 1993, 55).

In addition, in 1961, the establishment of the Combined Federal Cam
paign allowed certain charities to solicit charitable contributions from

50

An Overview of the Nonprofit-Government Relationship

federal employees (Bremner 1988. chapter 13). Nor was the experience
of expanded government financial support for nonprofits limited to
the social services, In a study of 16 local communities in 1982, gov
ernment reliance on nonprofit organizations to deliver public services
was found to be extensive in social services. housing and community
development. health care, and the arts. In each of these fields, more
than 40 percent of government expenditures were allocated to private.
nonprofit organizations (Salamon 1987). In the arts, the creation of
the National Endowment was a particularly important element in the
developing public/private partnership:
According to Senator Claiborne Pell, who helped to draft the enabling
legislation, the notion of using the Endowment "as a catalyst ... [to]
help spark nonfederal support ... was the key to the entire proposal."
With the creation of the NEA, the notion of public/private partnerships
emerged full blown (McCarthy, undated, 32).

International relief was another area where public support of non
profit efforts became important:
The engines of cooperation between public and private sector efforts in
overseas aid were the Food for Peace Program, originating in 1954, and
the Agency for International Development (AID), founded in 1961 ...
people to people groups such as Catholic Relief, CARE, Church World
Service, and the American Joint Distribution Committee distributed 70
percent of the donations.... In addition to supplying surplus commod
ities, mostly food, the government paid the overseas freight costs of
clothing, medicine, and other material purchased by or given to volun
tary agencies by their members (Bremner 1988, 196-7).

While the expansion of contractual arrangements between govern
ment and nonprofits was dramatic in the 1960s and 1970s, Bremner
(1988) stresses its continuity with earlier periods in American history:
In some respects purchase of service agreements marked a return, al
though on a much larger scale, of the nineteenth-century practice of
granting subsidies from public funds to private orphanages, hospitals,
and relief societies. Had advocates or critics of privatization chosen to
do so they might have cited examples in earlier periods of American
history when towns, counties, and states delegated responsibility for
the care of the poor and criminals to private contractors (202).

The reverse model of private financing and public provision has
also appeared throughout U.S. history. In the early republic, for ex
ample, Stephen Girard made bequests to the city of Philadelphia for
improvement of certain streets and to the state of Pennsylvania for the
development of canals (Bremner 1988. 39). Later examples include
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James Smithson's gift to the federal government for what became the
Smithsonian Institution, Andrew Mellon's gift of the National Gallery,
and Andrew Carnegie's gifts of public libraries to many communities
(Bremner 1988). This tradition is also reflected in various voluntary
campaigns to raise charitable funds for government monuments, in
cluding the building of the Washington Monument and the refurbish
ing of the Statue of Liberty; foundations' contributions to fund drives
during and after World Wars I and II; the establishment of the Sanitary
Commission during the Civil War to improve conditions in military
camps; and various other organized voluntary efforts to financially
assist government in wartime from revolutionary times to the present
era (Bremner 1988). Indeed, the tradition continues unabated:
Private givers further supported their part of the public-private part
nership by contributing to mainly tax-supported institutions such as
state colleges and universities, public radio and television stations, and
public or endowed museums, libraries, parks and zoos. Nearly every
public educational, civic, or cultural institution cultivated "Friends"
whose gifts supplemented appropriations from federal, state, or local
government. In New York City in 1987 twenty public monuments in
need of costly repair were put up for "adoption" by private donors; in
Washington, nc., the National Park Service, operating on a tight
budget, asked private individuals to donate money to replace aging and
dying cherry trees around the Tidal Basin (Bremner 1988. 211).

Finally, the complementary relationships of government and non
profits extend to more subtle instances where government has acted
as an encourager and cheerleader of nonprofit-seCtor efforts. In the
early years of the depression, for example, President Hoover "enlisted
the services of one hundred leaders of business, industry, finance and
philanthropy" in the "task of mobilizing and coordinating the chari
table resources of the country" (Bremner 1988, 139). National admin
istrations exerted similar efforts during wartime, and in the 1990s we
have witnessed such efforts as the Points of Light program and the
President's Summit aimed at stimulating volunteerism and engaging
business in the solution of social issues.
The early 1980s was a high-water mark in the partnership between
government and nonprofit organizations in the delivery of public
services. at least in terms of funding. Beginning in the Reagan admin
istration, however, policy initiatives shifted toward cutbacks in gov
ernment funding and encouragement of private organizations to take
up the slack not only in terms of service delivery but resource support
as well. Still, funded partnership arrangements between government
and nonprofits persist and even continue to be the norm. With the
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acceleration of federal devolution in the 1990s, however, much de
pends on the propensity of state and local governments to compensate
for federal budget cuts and exploit the flexibility of new block-granting
arrangements to expand and diversify contracting with private pro
viders. That prospect is by no means certain:
The federal money machine is turned off. This is not just a fiscal event.
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financially troubled traditional agencies.... With these public funds
agencies enter into a new relationship to government. Agencies which
for decades had relied on private contributions or small government
subsidies were now primarily dependent on government funds .... The
traditional agencies had now become instrumentalities of government
funding, expanding beyond niches supported by private funds (Smith
and Lipsky 1993, 58-60).

It shifts the social policy agenda to others-mainly to state govern

ments-when it comes to defining social needs, determining how to
meet them, and deciding who should have the responsibility for doing
so. Nonprofit organizations have every reason to be very nervous about
these budget reductions (Nathan 1996, 49).

The complementary lens reveals a very different overlay of non
profit-government relations than does the supplementary lens.
Through the complementary lens we see one sector engaging the other
in order to get the public's business done together. At various times
and places in American history, private philanthropy has been a sup
portive force, helping government with financing to get its work done.
More generally, government has been the driver, looking to nonprofits
as means of delivering mainstream public services under mandates of
public policy. That orientation was particularly apparent in the post
World War II period when the federal government allocated massive
new funding for social services, health care, education, and the arts
but largely resisted the creation or expansion of new government
bureaucracies to deliver those services. In terms of theory, the trans
actions and production costs associated with contracting with or sub
sidizing existing nonprofits, as well as creating many new nonprofit
organizations, were apparently more reasonable than those associated
with administering a greatly expanded governmental delivery system.
While efficacious for government, the partnership model, under
which government finances and nonprofits deliver the services, may
have looked more ominous for nonprofits. As noted, this mode of
government-nonprofit relations clearly gained prominence in the
1960s and 1970s. And it would appear that nonprofits could hardly
have resisted its momentum. Given mandates for expanded public
services and facing internal fiscal problems, many nonprofits had the
choice of joining the parade or being swept aside:
As demands for social services burgeoned with the mobilization and
social ferment in American cities in the 1960s, traditional agencies ex
perienced pressures from within and without to expand their activi
ties
Federal funding ... pushed up revenues throughout the
sector
The growth of government funding clearly bailed out many

History through the AdversariaI Lens
As nonprofit organizations became more dependent on government
funding in the 1960s and 1970s, the nature of the relationship between
government and nonprofits changed in other ways as well:
Historically, government purchased services from charitable organiza
tions and attached few strings beyond those common to many other
service purchasers. Today governments contract for whole programs,
and even create providers where they otherwise do not exist. There is
more contracting today than ever before, and the terms of contracting
are more demanding. If in the past government went to the private sec
tor for limited services, today its purchasing power is such that it is
often in a position to shape the sorts of services offered by private pro
viders (Smith and Lipsky, 9-10).

Thus, public funding has been accompanied by greater governmental
control and regulation of nonprofits. Some of this regulation derived
from failures similar to those that occur in• the profitmaking market
place:
During the 1950s standards of care in some of the traditional service
areas started to come under criticism ... for example ... systems of
adoption placement dependent upon sectarian community agen
cies.... Social welfare advocates attacked the larger traditional agen
cies for neglecting the needs of the poor and racial and ethnic
minorities. Meanwhile, government officials exerted greater regulatory
oversight over private social programs, especially on public safety and
staffing issues (Smith and Lipsky, 53).

Another form of reaction took place in the arts, where government
officials sought to censor artistic endeavor and restrict funding for
controversial projects:
Questions of censorship, state control, and ideology surrounded the de
mise of the Federal Writers and Theater Projects in the 1930s, only to
reemerge in more vitriolic form at century's end.... Led by Senator
Jesse Helms, conservatives balked at what they deemed the use of pub
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lie monies to display works that they considered obscene (McCarthy,
undated,43-44).

While government oversight, regulation, and control of nonprofit
sector services grew considerably in the mid- and late twentieth cen
tury in the United States, those functions, too, have long historical
roots. The earliest manifestations of government control of nonprofits
predate the republic and center on the debate concerning the very
existence of nonprofits as corporate entities. In colonial times, the
status of nonprofits was unclear. Recall that Harvard College was
governed by boards composed of ministers and government officials
(Hall 1992, 16-17). In the early days of the republic, government
nonprofit relations differed by state, depending on the state's position
on the issue of incorporation of private organizations:
In the South, a forcefully expressed body of anticorporate doctrine be
gan to emerge, largely under the tutelage of Thomas Jefferson. Although
favoring the freedom of individuals to associate for common purposes,
Jefferson worried that such groups, if incorporated and empowered to
hold property, would become the basis for new kinds of tyranny ... he
believed that all (organizations]-governmental and nongovernmen
tal-should be restricted in their powers and privileges (Hall, 22-23).

A crucial turning point was the Dartmouth College case, which:
... involved New Hampshire's efforts to take over Dartmouth College.
When Jeffersonians took control of the legislature in 1816, they reorga
nized the college, changed its name, and replaced its twelve-member
self-perpetuating board with twenty-one gubernatorially appointed
trustees and a board of twenty-five legislatively appointed overseers,
who enjoyed veto power over the trustees. The president of the college
was required to report annually to the governor on its management,
and the governor and his council were empowered to inspect the col
lege every five years and report on its condition to the legislature (Hall,
28-29).

Dartmouth College ultimately won its case in the Supreme Court in
1818, on the grounds that the college's charter constituted a contract
between trustees and donors that could not be violated without con
travening the Constitution. This set the precedent that has allowed
nonprofit corporations in the United States to maintain their corpo
rate integrity without threat of arbitrary governmental intervention.
Still, government regulation of nonprofits continued to evolve. For
example, at the time of the Civil War, the U.S. Freedmen's Bureau
attempted to discourage duplication in the efforts of voluntary socie
ties devoted to the needs of freed slaves. Around the same period,
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several states established state charity boards "to inspect, report
upon, and make recommendations for improving public welfare in
stitutions and such private ones as received state assistance" (Brem
ner 1988, 91).
National emergencies sometimes required unusually heavy control
of nonprofits by government. Just prior to World War II, the Neutrality
Act of 1939 required "voluntary agencies which wished to engage in
civilian war relief in belligerent countries to register with and submit
monthly reports to the Department of State" (Bremner 1988, 158). And
during World War II, the Roosevelt administration established the War
Relief Control Board:
The board now had the power to control all solicitations for voluntary
war relief.... It had power to license and withdraw licenses from war
relief agencies and, in the interest of economy and efficiency, to elimi
nate or merge organizations. The board scheduled the various national
fund appeals and prevented competing campaigns during the periods
set aside for the Red Cross National War Fund, United Jewish Appeal,
and War Bond drives. The staff of the Control Board sharply scruti
nized overhead costs and made reasonable economy of operation a re
quirement for continued licensing (Bremner 1988, 159-160).

In the 1970s, charitable solicitation gained prominence as an issue
for state and local governmental regulation:
Just as conduct of foundations had seemed to require corrections in the
1960s so, in the 1970s, according to many state and local officials, the
activities of charities that solicited money from the public needed to be
brought under closer scrutiny. By the end of the decade twenty states
and numerous county and local governments had adopted laws or ordi
nances limiting charity solicitations to organizations that could prove a
sizable proportion of the collection went for charitable purposes rather
than for salaries and administrative costs (Bremner 1988, 190).

As Bremner hints in the above quotation, perhaps the most vocif
erous efforts at government regulation of nonprofits have been those
directed toward foundations. Here the issue has been the concentra
tion of private power under nonprofit auspices, and the public influ
ence of that power. These concerns were apparent in the Jeffersonian
era and became prominent again in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries with the blossoming of the large industrial enter
prises and the concentration of private wealth in the large foundations
of Carnegie, Rockefeller, Ford, and others. It was no secret that these
institutions intended to influence public affairs:
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The new foundations, particularly Russell Sage and Rockefeller, were
unusual for not only the broad discretion granted their trustees but
also their explicit goals of reforming social, economic, and political
life. These lofty ends were to be achieved not by direct political action,
but by studying conditions, making findings available to influential cit
izens, and mobilizing public opinion to bring about change. This rela
tionship between academic experts, influential private parties, and
government would become the paradigm of a new kind of political pro
cess-one based on policy rather than politics (Hall 1992, 48).
Although concerns about the power of foundations were expressed
in the 1930s and 1940s, the issue intensified in the 1950s:
In April 1952, the Select (Cox) Committee for the House of Representa

tives began an investigation of "educational and philanthropic founda
tions and other comparable organizations which are exempt from
federal taxation to determine whether they are using their resources for
the purposes for which they were established ... (Hall 1992, 68).
This began a series of congressional inquiries into foundations, pick
ing up steam in the 1960s when foundations such as Field, Ford, and
others were becoming particularly active on social issues such as
voter registration, school decentralization, and urban poverty. Ulti
mately, the 1969 Tax Reform Act put new restrictions on foundations
and other tax-exempt organizations:
The 1969 Tax Reform Act created a large number of new regulations for
private foundations, mainly aimed at keeping foundations out of poli
tics, preventing them from controlling large business interests, and
making them more open and accountable (O'Neill 1989, 146).
Governmental efforts on restricting foundations can be seen as part
of a wider effort by government to limit advocacy by nonprofit orga
nizations. As Simon (1987) notes:
The federal tax code limits the channels through which nonprofits can
participate in public affairs activities, here defined as "those activities
which seek to study, criticize, inform people about, and modify the
actions of government at all levels" (90).
In the 1990s, conservatives in Congress made several attempts to pass
the Istook amendment, which would ban lobbying by any nonprofit
organization receiving federal funding. This issue, too, has a histori
cal pedigree. As Bremner (1988) recounts:
Rules against lobbying by tax-exempt organizations ... went back to
1934 and had been reiterated in 1954 and strengthened in 1969. Efforts
at relaxation of the rules began in the latter year when the American
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Bar Association ... charged that the neutrality of the tax laws with
respect to lobbying had been upset in favor of business interests
against charitable organizations.... In addition to the fairness issue
advocates of relaxation questioned the constitutionality of the restric
tions and charged the Nixon administration used IRS audits to harass
groups that criticized or opposed its policies (194).
Indeed, during the 1970s the pressure from government to suppress
advocacy cut a broad swath, extended to grant-making:
During the Nixon administration the tax-exempt status of civil rights,
welfare rights, environmental, and antiwar groups, and public interest
law firms received censorious attention from the Internal Revenue Ser
vice. In 1974 Alan Pifer, president of the Carnegie Corporation of New
York, called the situation "paradoxical": foundations were advised they
could engage in activities bearing on public policy development but
given to understand that it would be unwise to do so (Bremner 1988,
191).

Nor was the Nixon administration the last in pressing to restrict non
profit advocacy prior to the 1990s. In the 1980s, for instance, the
Reagan administration worked to exclude advocacy organizations
from the Combined Federal Campaign (Bremner 1988).
It appears that, through various regulations and restrictions, gov
ernment has attempted to restrict the activities of nonprofits and hold
them accountable to the public. Reciprocal efforts by private interests,
through the ongoing formation and development of voluntary associ
ations, have served to hold government to account, to influence the
direction of public policy, and ultimately to protect the nonprofit
sector itself from government attack. Hall (1992) provides a summary
of Tocqueville's observations in the early nineteenth century:
Tocqueville ... view[ed] private voluntarism ... as a fundamental part
of a national power system.... At its core there was, as he observed,
"a natural and perhaps a necessary connection" between the civil as
sociations and the political associations through which citizens com
bined to influence the state. And this connection was of no small
significance. First, it was the basis for organizing political opposition
to the power of elected officials.... Second, this connection was the
basis for formulating the conceptual agenda on which political opposi
tion necessarily had to be based. Tocqueville's belief that the ability of
an organized political opposition to diminish the moral authority of
the majority came not from its numerical strength, but from the pecul
iar relation of political and civil associations, through which "those
arguments that are most fitted to act on the majority" are discovered in
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the hope of ultimately "drawing over the majority to their own side,
and then controlling the supreme power in its name" (85-86).
O'Neill (1989) ties these developments back to religious diversity in
the colonies and early republic, leading to the first amendment to the
Constitution as a fundamental pillar of the nonprofit sector in its
advocacy role:
... the First Amendment, which deals with freedom of religion, free
dom of speech, freedom of assembly, and the right to petition govern
ment over grievances, can without exaggeration be seen as the Magna
Carta of the nonprofit sector in American life. These First Amendment
freedoms guarantee not only to individuals but also to groups the right
to assemble, speak out, and proclaim values and beliefs. The indepen
dence of the independent sector finds its strongest legal support in the
First Amendment, including its religious liberty clause (30).
Since colonial times social reformers have been active in pushing
government to take action or institute programs in such areas as
prison reform, help for the poor and homeless, care of neglected chil
dren, opposition to slavery and assistance to freedmen, and improve
ment of schools. Such activity has extended to the improvement of
governance itself. In the context of the settlement house movement of
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Bremner (1988) ob
serves a host of voluntary associations were at work or organizing to
strengthen the social framework of democracy and to restore and
extend the principles of self-government (109). Women's movements
have been a very important strand of public policy advocacy:
A growing number of scholars have set about to analyze the connec
tions between activism of women's groups and government policy in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.... They have
stressed the relationship between women's voluntary associations and
the creation of social services and political programs that in the United
States culminated in the New Deal and the welfare state.... Women's
efforts to establish playgrounds, libraries, and public health programs
and their activism in state and local government contributed to the de
velopment of federal programs like Social Security and Aid to Depen
dent Children.... Their voluntary associations constituted a link
between grassroots women's groups and those women who gained na
tional power and recognition, for example, Frances Perkins, the first
female cabinet member. These women were able to build on small, lo
cal issues to lay the groundwork for the campaigns for social justice
that ultimately shaped national policy (Robertson 1998, 193).
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Overall, social action movements, manifested largely though vol
untary organizations, have been aimed at changing public policy
across a broad spectrum of issues:
America from the start has been a hotbed of social, economic, reli
gious, and political reformism.... The revolution, the Civil War, Popu
lism, Progressivism, and the New Deal have been among the earlier
surges. The years since World War II have seen the eruption of a com
bination of powerful thrusts of dissent and demands for change. The
most notable of these have been the civil rights movement, the anti
Vietnam War movement, the student rebellion, the environmental
movement, the consumer protection movement, the women's liberation
movement, and the movement for greater responsiveness and accounta
bility of institutions, both government and corporate (Nielsen 1979,
157).

Bremner (1988) notes that the 1970s were an exceptionally active
period for advocacy organizations in the United States:
The same period that saw government and voluntary service agencies
working in closer cooperation also witnessed the rise of a great many
advocacy organizations monitoring the performance of government and
seeking to influence public policy by lobbying, demonstrations, litiga
tion, and empowerment of beneficiaries of social programs (203).
While Nielsen characterizes social movement organizations as the
"soft" part of the nonprofit sector, he acknowledges that the boundary
is fuzzy between this part of the sector and the highly structured
"hard," service-oriented part of the sector:
These distinctions are more clear in concept than in practice. Non
profit organizations do not break neatly into two distinct segments. _.
rather they are arranged as points along a spectrum according to the
particular mix of service orientation and reformism which gives each
its distinctive personality (156).
Still, the distinction is important because in it lies a fundamental
tension in the contemporary nonprofit-government relationship-to
what extent should organizations that receive tax benefits or direct
governmental support be allowed to spend that money to influence
public policy? Despite the different tax-exemption categories (for ex
ample, 501(c)3 versus 501(c)4), the virtual impossibility of segment
ing nonprofits neatly into those that do and do not attempt to influence
public policy promulgates a tension between government and non
profits that continues unabated to the present day.
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Interestingly, the blurring of nonprofit categories in the public policy
dimension is mirrored by blurring in the commercial sphere as well,
and this, too, has ramifications for the adversarial relationship with
government. Looking toward the end of the twentieth century and the
beginning of the next millennium, Weisbrod (1997) predicts:
... that the increased fiscal pressure on non profits will lead them to
generate new, more creative forms of commercial activities, and that
these new forms will further blur the distinctions between nonprofit
organizations and private firms. In the process, [ expect reconsidera
tion of many existing public policies regarding nonprofits: their subsi
dization and restrictions on their freedom to lobby government; to
engage in joint ventures with private firms; and to compete with pri
vate firms. [ also expect increased pressure from government to require
nonprofits to disclose more publicly their compensation of executives,
and I anticipate the applicability of antitrust laws to nonprofits to
emerge as a political issue (547).

The congressional attack on foundations of the 1950s and 1960s
galvanized foundations and other parts of the sector into unprece
dented collective action, first through exercises of self-study via the
Peterson and Filer Commissions, and ultimately to the organization
of Independent Sector, a comprehensive umbrella organization de
signed to increase public understanding about the sector and to ad
vocate for its interests at the national level. Thus, instead of continuing
to present itself in a fragmentary manner, the sector would for the first
time have a vehicle to speak as one vis-a.-vis government in addressing
public policy that affects nonprofit organizations. That voice has been
used subsequently to address major national policy initiatives of the
1980s and 1990s affecting the welfare of the sector, including the
Reagan budget cuts; the federal budget cuts proposed in connection
with the Contract with America (U.S. Congress 1995); changes in the
tax code such as above-the-line deductibility of contributions by non
itemizers, the proposed flat tax, and reductions in tax rates that would
reduce incentives to give; and the issue of intermediate sanctions for
disciplining nonprofits in violation of federal law, as well as the very
question of restrictions on lobbying by nonprofit organizations.
Governments have severely challenged nonprofits at the state and
local level in recent years as well, especially in connection with prop
erty tax exemptions. In the 1990s challenges to property tax exemp
tions have been pursued in many states, including Colorado, Maine,
New Hampshire, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Wiscon
sin (Salamon 1997). Mirroring its efforts at the national level, the
nonprofit sector has also begun to mobilize at the state and local
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levels, especially through state associations of nonprofit organiza
tions, which now exist in three dozen states. In the new environment
of devolution, these associations are intended to give the nonprofit
sector a stronger voice in the local policy process, especially in state
capitols. The free-rider tendencies that characterize the large and di
verse nonprofit sectors at the state and local levels hamper efforts to
mobilize these state associations. Federal devolution initiatives may,
however, ultimately prove to be the same kind of catalyst for organiz
ing nonprofits at the state level in the 1990s that congressional attacks
on foundations in the 1960s were for galvanizing collective action by
the sector at the national level.

THE CHANGING SOCIAL CONTRACT
The foregoing discussion suggests that, while each conceptual lens
offers substantial insight in every period, different views of the non
profit sector-government relationship have prevailed at different
times in U.S. history. The adversarial lens is especially helpful in
understanding the early republic, when public and private spheres of
autonomy were first being sorted out, and the mid- to late twentieth
century period, when government sought to redress the balance of
power of government and private interests. The supplementary lens
helps especially to illuminate the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, when private interests asserted themselves in providing for
social needs. The complementary lens is particularly useful in ex
plaining the post-World War II era, when government sought to ad
dress social needs without unduly expanding its own bureaucracy.
In each of these periods, there appears to have been an implicit,
though dynamic, understanding of the relative roles of government,
business, and the nonprofit sector in addressing the overall needs of
society. Before the period of rapid industrial growth, the "social con
tract" consisted of a division of responsibilities between very modest
government efforts to provide for social needs and multiple, autono
mous private efforts. With massive changes following the Civil War,
including industrialization and immigration, the private sector
through new social welfare associations and underwriting of various
forms of welfare capitalism by the business sector-assumed new
levels of responsibility for collective needs. In the mid-twentieth cen
tury, an American version of the welfare state emerged, with govern
ment, partnered with nonprofit organizations, providing for public
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needs not only in human services but extending to the arts, education,
health, the environment, and other fields. While there is substantial
variation among areas of public service activity, these chronological
patterns are remarkably similar from field to field over the past three
centUIies (O'Neill 1989). There is nothing permanent, however, about
the pattern of intersector relations from era to era:
Relations between responsibilities assigned the three sectors are nei
ther rigidly defined nor permanently fixed but shift from time to time
to meet changing circumstances and needs (Bremner 1991, 216).
The present era of the 1980s and 1990s is manifesting another sea
change in which the social contract is implicitly being rewritten. Seen
through the three lenses of government-nonprofit relations, however,
the new contract appears to be substantially incomplete. One princi
pal emphasis appears again to be most visible through the supple
mentary lens, where government is seen as taking a relatively passive,
fiscally conservative role in public service provision, and the private,
nonprofit sector is expected to move to the fore with new levels of
charitable funding and volunteering. Unlike the turn-of-the-century
period 100 years ago, however, which also witnessed the rapid growth
of new industrial enterprise and amassing of private wealth, it is not
clear what contemporary economic engines are able or willing to
power new private initiatives of requisite strength. Certainly there are
impressive new industrial enterprises now, especially in the technol
ogy and communications areas, but these are embedded in a highly
competitive international economy that leads them to downsize and
shed employees rather than take care of them. And while there have
been massive gifts by corporate titans such as George Soros and Ted
Thrner, these have been isolated instances; corporate philanthropy
generally is becoming more of an exercise in strategic marketing and
employee morale-building than corporate social responsibility (Bur
lingame and Young 1996). Certainly there is massive new private in
dividual and corporate wealth, but tax reform policy initiatives, such
as tax simplification and lowering of tax rates, threaten to undermine
rather than strengthen incentives for charitable giving (Steinberg
1996). Additionally, concerns about "unfair competition" voiced by
the business sector and more general anxieties about corruption of
nonprofits as a consequence of their involvement in market enterprises
may eventually limit the ever-increasing dependence of nonprofit or
ganizations on commercial sources of income (Weisbrod 1998).
The complementary lens reveals an arena in which government
nonprofit partnerships could evolve very differently. The numbers and
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variety of arrangements through which government and nonprofits
collaborate are no doubt increasing-as government seeks ways of
squeezing more out of its limited resource base-but such collabo
ration could no longer be the main event if government. at least at the
federal level and possibly at all levels, removes itself from bottom-line
financial responsibility for providing public services.
Viewed through the adversariallens, the changing social contract
is even more in flux. While extolling the virtues of private, charitable
initiative, many legislators seem more willing now both to challenge
the tax exemptions of nonprofit organizations and to limit the voice
of nonprofits in the policy arena. Thus, while reducing its own re
source commitments to social needs, government appears also to be
hampering the ability of nonprofits to function successfully, both in
raising their own resources and in speaking out for those who may be
ill-served under a new regime of limited government responsibility.
While the current changes derive from various political agendas as
well as economic forces, the incompleteness of the pending new social
contract may be more a matter of inattention than illintenUon. Ex
amination of the contemporary scene through the three lenses reveals
gaps and inconsistencies that need to be brought to consciousness
and resolved through some holistic concept of what the new contract
ought to be. What are the roles of nonprofits and government, abso
lutely and in relation to one another, and what is the social role of
business and private wealth? If nonprofits are to assume new levels
of public responsibility, how can resources be mobilized for them to
do so? How can they do so if government limits tax incentives to give,
questions the legitimacy of nonprofit commercial enterprise, and sup
presses nonprofits, voice in the public policy arena? And if private
wealth is to drive new levels of voluntary initiative, how can that
wealth be mobilized? In particular, how can businesses and individ
uals of means be encouraged to contribute at a level that compensates
for governmental withdrawal? Or will we live in a society in which
great inequalities of wealth and welfare persist and grow, and social
problems fester without amelioration or resolution?
Nonprofit organizations appear to be caught in the middle of this
perplexing uncertainty over the pending social contract. Contempo
rary government policy toward the nonprofit sector is inconsistent, at
once encouraging the growth of voluntarism and private initiative and
at the same time limiting its resource base. And the role of the econ
omy's largest and arguably most important sector-business-re
mains anomalous, again largely due to the absence of an overall
concept of the social contract underlying public policy. On the one
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hand, business is reducing its explicitly philanthropic efforts. In ad
dition, segments of the business community object to expansion of
nonprofits into commercial arenas, while other parts of the business
sector expand into areas of health care, social services, and education
lhat once were more exclusive domains of nonprofit activity. On the
olher hand, businesses have discovered partnerships with nonprofits
as a lucrative marketing strategy, and employee voluntarism as an
efficient means of building morale and maintaining good relations in
the communities where they are located. Overall, however, the social
role of business remains in flux and is not clearly articulated as part
of an overall consensual social arrangement.
Benjamin Franklin was a great social reformer who was driven by
his own holistic concepts of society applicable to the times:
Self-reform through voluntary mutual-benefit associations led before
long to voluntary associations directed to public benefit. These would
eventually include subscription libraries, volunteer fire companies, a
hospital, and an academy, the latter of which received charters of in
corporation from the Pennsylvania legislature (Hall 1992, 19).

Franklin also invented bifocals. He knew how important it was to use
appropriate lenses in order to see things clearly at different distances.
For government-nonprofit relations and the issue of the social con
tract, Franklin might have prescribed trifocals. We need all three
conceptual lenses-supplementary, complementary, and adversar
ial-to bring the issues into full view and proper focus.

Note
I would like to thank Elizabeth Boris, Eugene Steuerle, Robert Wuthnow, Kathleen
McCarthy, Waldemar Nielsen, Robert Bremner, Richard Steinberg, and Stuart Mendel
for their helpful comments and suggestions.
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